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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel Neff timely appeals from the district court's orders revoking probation and
denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting leniency.
On appeal, Mr. Neff argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and
equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various transcripts he
requested be added to the record on appeal.

Additionally, Mr. Neff argues that the

district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence sua sponte upon
revoking probation. Alternatively, Mr. Neff argues that it abused its discretion when it
denied his Rule 35 motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Neff was charged, by information, with two counts of burglary and one count
of grand theft. (R., pp.23-25.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Neff pleaded guilty to
the foregoing charges. (R., pp.34-37.) Thereafter, the district court withheld judgment
and placed Mr. Neff on probation. (R., pp.40-41.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation alleging
that Mr. Neff violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.51-52.) Mr. Neff admitted that
he violated the terms of his probation by stealing multiple items from multiple
businesses. (R., pp.52-53, 59.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of four
years, with two years fixed, and placed Mr. Neff on probation. (R., p.60.)
After a second period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation
alleging that Mr. Neff violated the terms of his probation.

(R., pp.63-64.)

Mr. Neff

admitted that he violated the terms of his probation for having sexual intercourse with a
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fifteen year old.

(R., pp.63-64, 71-72.)

retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.73-74.)

The district court revoked probation and

Upon review of Mr. Neff's period of retained

jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended that sentence and placed
Mr. Neff on probation. (R., pp.76-78.)
After a third period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation and
an amended report of probation violation alleging that Mr. Neff violated the terms of his
probation.

(R., pp.87-88, 99-101.)

Mr. Neff admitted to violating the terms of his

probation by failing to comply with the rules of his sex offender treatment, contacting a
minor without an approved chaperone, having unapproved sexual contact with an adult,
and failing to maintain employment. (R., pp.99-101, 104.) The district court continued
Mr. Neff's probation. (R., p.106-107.)
After a fourth period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation,
alleging that Mr. Neff violated the terms of his probation.

(R., pp.111-113.) Mr. Neff

admitted to violating the terms of his probation by leaving the State without permission,
contacting a minor without an approved chaperone, and having unapproved sexual
contact with multiple adults.

(R., pp.111-112, 120-121.)

The district court revoked

probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.1-2.)
Approximately eleven days after the district court entered its order revoking
probation, Mr. Neff filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, 1 which was denied by the
district court. (R., pp.125-131.) Mr. Neff timely appealed. (R., pp.133-135.)
On appeal, Mr. Neff filed a motion to augment the record with various transcripts.
(Motion to Augment, pp.1-5.) The State objected in part to Mr. Neff's request for the
transcripts.

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule
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and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.15.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting Mr. Neff's request
for the admit/deny hearing held on February 13, 2012, the dispositional hearing held on
March 26, 2012, and the Rule 35 hearing held on October 29, 2012, but denied
Mr. Neff's request for the change of plea/sentencing hearing held on March 31, 2008,
the dispositional hearing held on October 27, 2008, the dispositional hearing held on
February 28, 2011, and the rider review hearing held on October 17, 2011.

(Order,

(hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)

Mr. Neff's Rule 35 motion and supporting exhibits were not included in the record on
appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Neff has filed a motion to augment concurrently herewith.
1
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Neff due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for review of the
issues on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Neff's
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Neff's Rule 35 motion
requesting leniency?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Neff Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied His Motion To Augment With Transcripts Necessary For Review Of The Issues
On Appeal
A.

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues on appeal or if a sufficient substitute for the transcript exists.
In this case the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Neff's request for transcripts of
the change of plea/sentencing hearing held on March 31, 2008, the dispositional
hearing held on October 27, 2008, the dispositional hearing held on February 28, 2011,
and the rider review hearing held on October 17, 2011.

On appeal, Mr. Neff is

challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts of the
dispositional hearing held on February 28, 2011, and the rider review hearing held on
October 17, 2011. 2 Mr. Neff asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the
issues of whether the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his

Judge Brent Moss presided over the change of plea/sentencing hearing held on
March 31, 2008, and the dispositional hearing held on October 27, 2008. (R., p.37, 59.)
However, Judge Gregory Moeller presided over all of the subsequent hearings in this
matter. As such, Mr. Neff is not challenging the denial of his request for the change of
plea/sentencing hearing held on March 31, 2008, and the dispositional hearing held on
October 27, 2008, on appeal.
2
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sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation and whether the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion because the applicable standard of review
requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the
proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's sentencing decisions. Therefore,
the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court. By Failing To Provide Mr. Neff With Access To The
Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And Equal Protection
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merits Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing
Claims
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art.

I§ 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Sec. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute.

See

I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant
transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates
6

the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a).
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..
. ." Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to

be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting substantial rights of the defendant."

State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852

(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b)
motion is an appeal as of right as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9). See State v.
Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding an order denying a motion for reduction

of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to I.AR. 11(c)(6)).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions directly
addressing whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the
requested material are unnecessary or frivolous.

7

The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time,
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on equal footing before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on the account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold
as follows:
There is no meaningful distinction betwe~n a rule which would deny
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
8

Id. at 18 (citations omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due

process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record
which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.

At the same time, the

Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary in instances where
a less expensive, yet accurate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of the defendant's indigency. The
United States Supreme Court held that "once the State chooses to establish appellate
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. WNeffington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining whether access to transcripts based on a frivolousness
standard. "Under the present standard, .... they must convince the trial judge that
their contentions of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary
to prosecute their appeal." Draper, 327 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its
holding in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent
alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised on
9

appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held "where the grounds of appeal ... make out a colorable need
for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. Id at
195.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues
on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are
not relevant to the issues on appeal.

C.

The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Neff's Appeal Because He Is
Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire
Record Before The District Court
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this

appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. "When we
10

review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added).

In other

words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's sentencing decision conducts an
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports the district
court's sentencing decisions.

This scope of review is necessary in Idaho because

judges are not required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. State v. Nield,
106 Idaho 665,666 (1984).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an appeal filed
from an order revoking probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was
placed on probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to
violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms
of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed
from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held
11

that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court
of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination.
Specifically, it held:
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted).

The instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only challenged the order
revoking probation and Mr. Neff is challenging the length of his sentence, which entails
an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed
as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of
probation." 3 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the

3

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was
filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because Idaho Appellate Rule 30
requires that all motions to augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant
portions of I.AR. 30 follow:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.
12

requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation
revocation hearing is not germane to the question of whether the transcripts are
relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district
court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which
the appeal was filed. Rather, the court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its
own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74
(Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that
the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard
during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely
upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed
in the courts within its judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved");
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance
upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not
is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it already knows from

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Mr. Neff recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals has
recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 2013 Published
Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013). However, Mr. Neff disagrees with the holding in
that case.
13

presiding over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking
probation.
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals'
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court
of Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the revocation
of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independent and
comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events
which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings.

The basis for this

standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the
same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly

14

reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for this
standard of review to become applicable.
presumed

the

judge would

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals

automatically consider

prejudgment events

when

determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. Whether the
prior hearings were transcribed or not, is irrelevant, as an appellate court will presume
that the district court will remember and consider the events from the prior proceedings
when it executes a sentence after revoking probation.
In this case, Judge Moeller presided over the final disposition hearing held on
March 26, 2012. (R., pp120-121.) Judge Moeller also presided over the dispositional
hearing held on February 28, 2011, and the rider review hearing held on October 17,
2011. (R., pp.71, 76.) As such, the Adams Opinion indicates that an appellate court will
presume Judge Moeller relied on his memory of those proceedings when it executed
Mr. Neff's sentence after revoking probation.

Additionally, Judge Moeller expressly

stated that he reviewed Mr. Neff's file, which included a review of his notes from the
hearings at issue. (08/27/12 Tr., p.48, Ls.25 - p.49, L.2.) Since Moeller's notes would
have refreshed his memory of the hearings at issue, transcripts of those hearings will be
necessary for an appellate court to review the merits of his appellate sentencing claims.
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the
Idaho Supreme court's decision to deny Mr. Neff access to those transcripts constitutes
a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), a
transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed
without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must
provide an adequate record of face procedural default. "It is well established that an
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
15

court can review the merits of the claims of error, . . . . and where pertinent portions of
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also State v. Beason, 119
Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985).
If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes that may be
sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim is possible, then the
transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Court of Appeals has "strongly
suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide ... [a]
record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).
If Mr. Neff fails to provide the appellate court with transcripts necessary for review of his
claim, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Neff's sentencing claims will not be
addressed on their actual merits.

If it is state action, combined with Mr. Neff's

indigency, which prevents him from access to the necessary transcripts, then such
action is a violation of the equal protection and due process clauses and any such
presumption should no longer apply.
Moreover, the foregoing presumption should be reversed in this case, and what
occurred at those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's final
sentencing decision. When Mr. Neff was first given the opportunity of multiple periods
of probation, the district court must have found that the circumstances were right to give
him an opportunity to be a member of society. To ignore the positive factors that were
present at the previous hearings presents a negative, one-sided view of Mr. Neff.
Denial of access to the requested transcripts has prevented Mr. Neff from addressing
those positive factors in support of his appellate sentencing claims.
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In light of that

denial, Mr. Neff argues that the events which occurred at the subject hearings should be
presumed to invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary
for a merits-based review on appeal.

In this case, the requested transcripts are

necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review,
the focus is not entirely on the district court's express sentencing rationale 4 ; to the
contrary, the main question on appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's
ultimate sentencing decision. As such, the decision to deny Mr. Neff's request for the
transcripts will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the
missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a
procedural bar to the review of Mr. Neff's appellate sentencing claims on the merits and,
therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied.

Since Mr. Neff's request for the transcripts was

denied, that presumption should be reversed in his favor.

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have
consistently held that due process requires trial courts to expressly articulate, on the
record, their rationale for revoking probation in order to facilitate an effective merits
based review of those decisions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 152 (1986), supra.
4
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D.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Neff With Access To The
Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants counsel on
appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due process
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States

Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
supports his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any
argument to be made or undercutting an argument.
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Therefore, Mr. Neff has not

obtained review of the court proceeding based on the merits and was not provided with
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association's "Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function."

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking substance.
Standards 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Neff on the
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Neff is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective
counsel cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcripts.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Neff his constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection which include a right to effective assistance of counsel in
this appeal.

Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the

requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary
supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments which arise as a result of that review.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Neff's Sentence
Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
Mr. Neff asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of four
years, with two years fixed, is excessive.

Due to the district court's power under

I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the revocation
of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the sentence as being
excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Neff does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Neff must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
There are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that Mr. Neff's
sentence is excessively harsh.

Specifically, Mr. Neff's age is a mitigating factor.

Mr. Neff was only eighteen years old at the time he committed the underlying offense.
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(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1.) Mr. Neff had recently turned
twenty three years old when his probation was ultimately revoked. Mr. Neff's young age
is important because his recent probation violations were primarily based on age
appropriate sexual behavior and not theft related crimes.

For example, one of his

treatment providers characterized his sexual based probation violations as follows:
[T]his therapist notes that at least two of Mr. Neff's citied behavioral
violations represent relatively normal sexual behaviors, those of flirting,
dating, and engaging in sexual activity with peer-aged and consenting
individuals. Not to be flippant, but this therapist emphasizes the obvious:
[normal] sexual behaviors committed by sexual offenders should be
encouraged, not punished.
(February 23, 2012, letter written by Richard Meyers, p.2.) Mr. Neff recognizes that he
engaged in sexual behavior which was against the terms of his probation. However,
Mr. Neff had stopped engaging in criminal behavior and was acting age appropriately
when he committed his recent probation violations.

This, in turn supports the

conclusion that Mr. Neff had "grown up" a little and posed a reduced threat to the
community.
The foregoing position is further supported by the fact that Mr. Neff had been
accepted into college at the time of his final probation violation disposition hearing.
(08/27/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.8-20.) Mr. Neff also had multiple employment opportunities at
that time. (08/27/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.12-14.)
Additionally, Mr. Neff has family and community based support.

Mr. Neff's

parents are stable and his father is college professor at BYU Idaho.

(PSI, p.4.)

According to the original presentence investigator, Mr. Neff reported that he had a
stable and supportive family. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Neff received various letters from people
in his community expressing their belief that Mr. Neff has a good character.
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(December 12, 2010, letter written by Gary Evans; December 10, 2010, letter written by
Rob Ahrendsen.)
Mr. Neff does suffer from mental health issues.

Mr. Neff was adopted, and

according to his father, his biological mother was an alcoholic and Mr. Neff displayed
symptoms associated with fetal alcohol syndrome. (February 28, 2008, Letter written
By Rick Neff, attached to 2008 PSI, p.2.)
Finally, Mr. Neff's performance while on his rider is mitigating. While on his first
rider, Mr. Neff performed well and earned a probation recommendation from the Idaho
Department of Correction.

(Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, APSI), pp.2-5.) Mr. Neff also participated in a sexual offender treatment
program while on that rider and was classified as a low to moderate risk to reoffend
sexually. (Sex Offender Risk Assessment, attached to the APSI, p.3.)
In sum, there are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that
Mr. Neff's sentence is excessively harsh.

111.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Neff's Oral Rule 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency
Mr. Neff asserts that the unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, is
unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this matter. A
motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed is unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).

"The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested
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leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable." Id.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Neff incorporates herein the mitigating factors set
forth in Section 11, supra.
Mr. Neff's family will provide him continual support despite the fact that the
district court executed a prison sentence. At the Rule 35 hearing, Dr. Neff, Mr. Neff's
father, testified as follows:
I just want everyone to know that Ian, my son, I love you, I always have
and I always will. I believe in you. I believe you are not bound to fail, that
you're bound to succeed, that you can if you will.

Family lasts. Only family can last. Your mother and your brother and I
love you, your extended family are there for you and you have only to
make the decision that this is the time, this will be your new start for a new
beginning.
(10/29/12 Tr., p.65, L.6 - p.66, L.10.) Additionally, Mr. Neff provided support letters
indicating that he had a good character and was a hard worker. (Defendant's Exhibit
B.)

In sum, Mr. Neff's sentence is excessively harsh when viewed in light of the
mitigating factors present in this matter.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Neff respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments
which arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Neff

requests that the indeterminate portion of his sentence be reduced.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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